Why the Grass is not Always Greener: The Competing Effects of Environmental Regulations and Factor Intensities on US Specialization
Non-Technical Summary
During the last twenty-five years a variety of factors have contributed to the continuous evolution of the structure of US industry. One factor that has been given a great deal of attention is the general reduction in trade barriers -often cited as one of the main causes of the rise in competitive pressures faced by US industries. Alongside this decrease in trade barriers has been an increase in the stringency of US environmental regulations leading to concerns that pollution intensive industries, in particular, are being exposed to some of the fiercest competition from overseas.
The fear of a loss of competitiveness as a result of US environmental regulations is best illustrated by the debate surrounding the US refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol climate change treaty. President Bush has stated that since the treaty excludes the developing world from binding emissions reductions, its ratification would cause serious harm to the US economy. Both unions and trade associations have echoed this sentiment. The federation of US unions (the AFL-CIO) has claimed that the Kyoto Protocol would create a powerful incentive for industries to 'export jobs, capital and pollution,' whilst the Business Roundtable has claimed that increased environmental regulations in the US would 'lead to the migration of energy-intensive production -such as the chemicals, steel, petroleum refining, aluminium and mining industries -from the developed countries to the developing countries. ' A number of theoretical studies have provided similar conclusions. As a result of this debate there is a growing body of literature that examines the economic effects of environmental regulations and the extent to which they shape a country's comparative advantage. Whilst it may appear intuitively plausible that environmental regulations will affect US competitiveness, evidence of the migration or displacement of dirty industries from high regulation economies is mixed. As a result, a number of arguments have emerged to explain why clearer evidence of pollution haven pressures has not been found. For example, it has been argued that environmental regulations may be endogenously determined by trade since they may be used as secondary trade barriers i.e. a means of protecting domestic industry. Both of these studies find that US environmental regulations, when treated as an endogenous variable, do influence US trade patterns. Other explanations offered include the fact that environmental compliance costs are likely to form a small proportion of a firm's total costs; the dependence of heavy industries on home markets; the fact that low regulation countries may have certain characteristics which deter inward investment such as corruption, poor infrastructure and uncertain or unreliable legislation; and the possibility that foreign investors may be concerned about their international reputation and do not wish to be perceived to be taking advantage of slack environmental regulations.
In this paper we highlight an additional explanation of why environmental regulations do not appear to have had a widespread impact on trade and investment flows, namely the role played by an industry's human and physical capital requirements. First, we employ a range of industrial specialization indices to investigate graphically and descriptively whether the effect of the relative stringency of US environmental regulations has resulted in low and/or declining specialization in 'dirty' production as the pollution haven hypothesis predicts. Second, we examine the characteristics of pollution intensive industries and demonstrate that such industries tend to have two common features; (i) they are typically physical capital intensive, (ii) they tend to be relatively human capital intensive, a point not previously demonstrated. Third, we test these assertions by estimating econometrically the determinants of specialization. We demonstrate the statistical and economic significance of a number of key variables and estimate a range of specifications controlling for the potential endogeneity concerns discussed in the recent trade-environment literature.
1.

Introduction
The fear of a loss of competitiveness as a result of US environmental regulations is best illustrated by the debate surrounding the US refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol climate change treaty. President Bush has stated that since the treaty excludes the developing world from binding emissions reductions, its ratification would cause serious harm to the US economy. Both unions and trade associations have echoed this sentiment. The federation of US unions (the AFL-CIO) has claimed that the Kyoto Protocol would create a powerful incentive for industries to 'export jobs, capital and pollution,' 1 whilst the Business Roundtable has claimed that increased environmental regulations in the US would 'lead to the migration of energy-intensive production -such as the chemicals, steel, petroleum refining, aluminium and mining industries -from the developed countries to the developing countries.' 2 A number of theoretical studies have provided similar conclusions (see e.g Pethig 1976 , McGuire 1982 and Chichilnisky 1994 . Baumol and Oates (1988) , for instance, state that those countries that do not control pollution emissions, whilst others do, will 'voluntarily become the repository of the world's dirtiest industries' (p. 265). As a result of this debate there is a growing body of literature that examines the economic effects of environmental regulations and the extent to which they shape a country's comparative advantage (see e.g. Tobey 1990 , Copeland and Taylor 1994 , Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor 2001 , Cole and Elliott 2003 , Kahn 2003 , Copeland and Taylor 2004 .
Whilst it may appear intuitively plausible that environmental regulations will affect US competitiveness, evidence of the migration or displacement of dirty industries from high regulation economies is mixed. 3 As a result, a number of arguments have emerged to explain why clearer evidence of pollution haven pressures has not been found. Ederington and Minier (2003) and Levinson and Taylor (2004) The aim of this paper is to highlight an additional explanation of why environmental regulations do not appear to have had a widespread impact on trade and investment flows, namely the role played by an industry's human and physical capital requirements.
Focusing on the USA, the contribution of this paper is threefold: First, we employ a range of industrial specialization indices to investigate graphically and descriptively whether the effect of the relative stringency of US environmental regulations has resulted in low and/or declining specialization in 'dirty' production as the pollution haven 3 For example, Tobey (1990) , Jaffe et al. (1995) and Janicke et al. (1997) find no evidence to suggest that the stringency of a country's environmental regulations influences trade in dirty products. In contrast, a study of import-export ratios for dirty industries by Mani and Wheeler (1998) found evidence of temporary pollution havens, while Lucas et al. (1992) and Birdsall and Wheeler (1992) found that the growth in pollution intensity in developing countries was highest in periods when OECD environmental regulations were strengthened. Antweiler et al. (2001) studied the impact of trade liberalization on city-level sulfur dioxide concentrations and found some evidence of pollution haven pressures, a result supported by a complementary study by Cole and Elliott (2003) . Van Beers and Van den Bergh (1997) also found evidence to suggest that regulations influence trade patterns, although Harris et al. (2002) claim that no such influence is found if fixed effects are included. 4 See Neumayer (2001) for a review of these issues.
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hypothesis predicts. Second, we examine the characteristics of pollution intensive industries and demonstrate that such industries tend to have two common features; (i) they are typically physical capital intensive, as has recently been recognised (Antweiler et al., 2001, and Cole and Elliott, 2003) , (ii) they tend to be relatively human capital intensive, a point not previously demonstrated. It would appear that the industrial processes that require a highly skilled workforce are often those processes that are the most pollution intensive. In contrast, low-skill, labor-intensive processes tend to be relatively clean. Thus, dirty sectors are generally intensive in physical and/or human capital, two factors that appear to be important determinants of US specialization and which explain why relocation to developing countries may be less desirable for such industries. We argue that this explains why US specialization in dirty sectors is neither lower, nor falling more rapidly, than in clean sectors. Third, we test these assertions by estimating econometrically the determinants of specialization. We demonstrate the statistical and economic significance of a number of key variables and estimate a range of specifications controlling for the potential endogeneity concerns discussed in the recent trade-environment literature (Levinson and Ederington and Minier 2003) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our measures of specialization, while Section 3 discusses the data and provides some descriptive results.
Section 4 provides our econometric analysis examining the determinants of specialization indices, and Section 5 concludes.
Specialization Indices
Theories of comparative advantage, such as the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S) model, refer to patterns of pre-trade relative prices that we cannot observe.
Applied work uses observable data to infer or 'reveal' what would be the pattern of pretrade prices. In the H-O-S framework for example, differences in relative factor supplies are characterised in terms of 'abundance' or 'scarcity' where countries are assumed to export those goods whose production makes relatively intensive use of their abundant factors. Several 'specialization' measures, usually based around a country's net exports, 6 have been used to reveal which of these goods a country has a pre-trade comparative advantage in. This paper examines three such measures.
The starting point for the majority of empirical studies of specialization are measures of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) (originally proposed in an international trade context by Balassa 1965 Balassa , 1979 Balassa and 1986 . For a single country, the RCA index is defined as;
The numerator signifies the percentage share of a given sector in total exports where X it are exports from sector i in year t. The denominator represents the percentage share of a given sector in world exports (where subscript w denotes world). For a given sector, an RCA index value of one means that the percentage share of that sector is equal to the world average. An RCA value higher (lower) than one indicates specialization or that a country has a comparative advantage (under-specialized or has a comparative disadvantage) in that sector. Changes in RCA patterns are therefore consistent with changes in countries' relative factor endowments and productivity levels. Bowen (1983 Bowen ( , 1985 Bowen ( and 1986 , Deardorff (1984) and Balance et al. (1985 Balance et al. ( , 1986 Balance et al. ( and 1987 . Hillman (1980) for example, develops a necessary and sufficient monotonicity condition under identical homothetic preferences to investigate the association between the Balassa index and pre-trade prices for different industries across two countries.
For empirical testing however, the Balassa measure implies a risk of non-normality, because it takes values between zero and infinity. Since a value between zero and one represents a lack of specialization, yet a value between one and infinity represents the presence of specialization, regression analyses using RCA give too much weight to values above one.
6 A solution first suggested by Laursen (1998) 
Each RSCA index lies between minus and plus one (and avoids the problems of an undefined value which can occur in the logarithmic transformation if exports are zero in a given sector). Changes above and below the old RCA value of one are now treated symmetrically (see Larusen 1998 and Dalum et al. 1998 for further discussion).
We also use two additional specialization measures that have been widely employed in the literature. The first is the Michaely index (Michaely 1962) , defined as;
where X it and M it are exports and imports of sector i in year t respectively. The Michaely index ranges between plus and minus one. A positive (negative) value means a country is specialized (under-specialized) in that sector.
Our final measure is simply net exports, expressed as a share of each industry's value added.
6 One suggested solution is to use the logarithmic transformation of the Balassa index (see e.g. Vollrath 1991, Soete and Verspagen 1994) . This solution is however unsatisfactory because of the way it handles small RCA values. A change in the RCA index from 0.01 to 0.02 for example, has the same impact as a change from 50 to 100 (Dalum et al. 1998) .
where VA it is the value added of sector i in year t. Increasing NETXva for a specific industry implies that exports are increasing relative to imports and hence it may be inferred that specialization is increasing within that industry.
Although similar, our three measures are subtly different. RCA indices measure exports for an industry relative to its exports from other industries relative to other countries' exports from that industry. The Michaely index in comparison takes account of exports within an industry relative to imports within an industry, relative to total imports and exports with no mention of other countries' exports. Finally, net exports simply reports exports in an industry relative to imports in the same industry and are not expressed relative to other industries, or relative to other countries.
Specialization and the Characteristics of US Industry
We begin by computing US RCA patterns at the two and three-digit SIC (Standard Industrial Classification) levels of industry aggregation between 1978 and 1994. Since world trade data are not reported in the US SIC industry classification, all trade data were concorded to SIC from ISIC (International Standard Industrial Classification). Table 3 considers RCA, the Michaely index and net exports at a greater level of disaggregation. For the ten dirtiest three-digit industries our specialization indices are reported for the first and last years in our sample (1978 and 1994) , with the change over this period highlighted. We find that the seven dirtiest three-digit industries all experienced an increase in RCA between 1978-1994. Similarly we find that the Michaely and net export measures record increases for six out of the ten industries. Our results therefore indicate that there is no systematic tendency for US specialization to 11 Plotting the Michaely index and net exports over time for the dirtiest industries yields very similar trends to those in Figure 1 . Specifically, both indicate a significant level of specialization in the Chemicals industry (SIC 28), with no notable 'despecialization' across dirty sectors. For reasons of space these Figures were omitted. decline in pollution intensive industries. If anything, there is evidence that such specialization is actually deepening. or falling more rapidly in its dirtiest sectors rather than in its cleanest sectors.
In order to provide an explanation for these specialization patterns we investigate the role played by the characteristics of US industries, specifically their human and physical capital intensity. We define physical capital intensity (PCI) as the non-wage share of value added and human capital intensity (HCI) as the share of value added that is paid to skilled workers. 13 Figure 2 plots RCA for the three sectors that have the highest and the lowest physical capital intensity. Notice that the PCI and RCA rankings are matched apart from Petroleum and Coal (SIC29) that has the highest PCI but only the third highest RCA. A Spearman rank correlation between RCA and PCI averaged over our time period at the two-digit level records a value of 0.56 (significant at the 5% level). At the three-digit level the Spearman rank correlation is 0.39 (significant at the 5% level). For the US, we also suspect that the human capital requirements of an industry (skills, training, education) have a strong influence on RCA patterns. Indeed, the Spearman correlations of average HCI and average RCA over our period record values of 0.51 and 13 The Appendix explains how these variables are calculated. 0.50, significant at the 5% level at the three and two-digit levels respectively. Figure 3 plots RCA for the three sectors that have the highest and lowest human capital intensity.
As with physical capital, it can be seen that the human capital-intensive sectors such as Transportation (SIC37) and Paper (SIC26) have higher RCA indices than the least human capital-intensive sectors Textiles (SIC22) and Leather (SIC31). Figures 2 and 3, together with a casual examination of Table 1 , therefore suggest, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the USA's revealed comparative advantage in an industry is heavily influenced by the human and physical capital requirements of that industry (see Leamer 1984 for an excellent overview of the relationship between trade and endowments). We believe this finding provides an explanation of why the US is not experiencing low and/or reduced specialization in pollution intensive industries despite having relatively high environmental regulations (particularly compared to US trading partners in developing regions). Several recent studies have suggested that there exists a correlation between the pollution intensity (or pollution abatement costs) and the physical capital intensity of an industry (Antweiler et al. 2001 and Cole and Elliott 2003) . Pollution intensive industrial processes are typically those that use heavy machinery reliant on large amounts of energy. In contrast, labor intensive processes are often less dependent on energy and hence are relatively clean. No matter which measure of PCI we use (see the Appendix for alternative definitions of PCI), or whether we use two-digit or threedigit data, we find statistically significant correlations between PCI and pollution abatement operating costs per unit of value added (PAOCva). At the two-digit level for the period 1978-1994 (n = 272), for example, we estimate a correlation of 0.64 between non-wage value added and PAOCva. Using the NBER's measure of total real capital stock per worker we find a correlation of 0.87 with PAOCva.
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The link between pollution and capital intensity appears to be well grounded. What has not previously been recognised, however, is the fact that there is also a significant correlation between an industry's human capital requirements and its pollution intensity.
Cleaner industries tend to rely on relatively low-skilled employees whilst the more complex industrial processes that typically depend on greater energy use, tend to require greater amounts of human capital. At the two-digit level we estimate normal correlations of 0.58 between HCI and PAOCva and a Spearman correlation of 0.54 (both statistically significant).
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To further illustrate the linkages between PAOCva and PCI and HCI, Table 4 summarises the characteristics of our 96 three-digit industries by averaging over time and then ranking by PAOCva. Our industries are then split into approximate quintiles (i.e. dirtiest 20, next dirtiest 20 and so on) and a number of alternative measures of PCI and HCI, as defined in the Appendix, are reported. As each group of industries becomes cleaner, 14 Spearman correlations are 0.48 and 0.67, respectively. Three-digit correlations are very similar and are all statistically significant. Similarly, significant correlations are found between Hettige et al.'s (1994) sectoral pollution intensities and PCI. 15 Statistically significant correlations are also found at the three-digit level and also between PAOCva and alternative measures of HCI. A scatterplot of the relationship between HCI and PAOCva provides equally strong evidence of a positive relationship and is available from the authors upon request. Table 4 reveals that practically all PCI and HCI measures decline. Thus, across a large sample of industries, those industries with above average pollution intensity are also typically characterised by above average physical and human capital intensity. Furthermore, as can be seen by referring back to Table 2 , although PAOCva has been increasing steadily over time for practically all sectors, the same is also true of PCI and HCI. Thus, any negative impact of abatement costs on US specialization is likely to be offset by the positive relative impact of human and physical capital intensity. Overall, the net effect of these three factors on specialization may be small or even positive. In order to subject these assertions to a more rigorous analysis, we now estimate the determinants of US specialization patterns econometrically.
Econometric Analysis
The previous section has revealed that US specialization in pollution intensive sectors does not appear to be low and/or declining. We asserted that a possible explanation is that dirty sectors also tend to be physical and human capital intensive. In order to put this claim to the test we estimate the determinants of US industry specific RCA (RSCA), the where SPEC it denotes RSCA, the Michaely index or net exports and PAOCva denotes pollution abatement operating costs per unit of value added. Our measure of physical capital intensity, PCI, is defined as the non-wage share of value added. Human capital intensity, HCI, is defined as the share of value added paid to skilled workers. Tariff denotes import duties per unit of imports within each industry, whilst γ and τ are industry and time specific effects, respectively. Since visual plots of PCI and HCI against RSCA, the Michaely index and net exports suggested the possibility of a quadratic relationship, squared terms are included for PCI and HCI to allow the possibility of a diminishing effect at the margin.
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Where both the linear term and the quadratic term are not significant, the quadratic term was dropped. Expected signs are β 1 < 0, β 2 > 0, β 3 < 0, β 4 > 0 β 5 < 0 and β 6 > 0 and are indicated below each variable in equation (5).
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Since RSCA and the Michaely index express each US industry relative to other US industries, for these two specialization indices we express each of our independent variables relative to the three-digit industry average for each year. However, since RSCA expresses US trade specialization relative to world trade specialization, the independent variables in equation (5) would ideally be expressed relative to world averages for each industry and year when estimating RSCA. Whilst such data would be difficult to attain for PCI, HCI and tariffs, comparable industry specific PAOC are not reported for other countries as we have already noted. Equation (5) is therefore our best attempt to explain US RSCA.
17 Quadratic terms were also tested for PAOCva and tariffs but were insignificant in all cases and hence were dropped from our estimations. 18 See the Appendix for a description and source of each variable.
For each specialization measure, Table 5 provides two sets of estimates, the first based on 'pooled' data with no industry specific fixed effects, the second with fixed effects included. In all six estimations we find pollution abatement costs within an industry to be a statistically significant negative determinant of that industry's RSCA, Michaely index or net exports. In contrast, we find the relative human and physical capital intensity of a sector to be positive and significant determinants of RSCA and Michaely, with physical capital intensity having a diminishing effect at the margin. For net exports, we found the quadratic PCI term to be statistically insignificant and hence it was dropped from the estimation. Evidence of a quadratic relationship was instead found between net exports 19 All estimations use heteroscedastic-robust standard errors.
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and HCI. The Hausman tests all reject the null of a non-systematic difference between the 'pooled' results and the fixed effects results, indicating that industry controls are required.
These results therefore suggest that US comparative advantage in a sector is positively influenced by a sector's physical and human capital intensity and negatively influenced by the level of abatement costs within an industry. Whilst we have noted that, for the RSCA estimates, the independent variables should ideally be expressed relative to world averages, the robustness of our results suggests that US observations are capturing the differential between US industry characteristics and the rest of the world's characteristics quite successfully. This would imply that non-US industrial characteristics have remained relatively stable over time.
However, several recent studies have suggested that an industry's abatement costs may be endogenously determined by its net exports (Levinson and Taylor 2004, Ederington and Minier 2003) . We here examine these arguments in more detail and undertake an econometric exercise that enables us to allow for potential endogeneity problems. We limit this more detailed analysis to net exports due to space constraints, concern surrounding the appropriate specification for the RSCA estimates, and the fact that the other studies examining endogeneity in this context also consider net exports, thereby allowing comparison with our results.
The literature to date has suggested two principal sources of endogeneity:
(i) Do imports influence abatement costs? Levinson and Taylor (2004) suggest that the fact that most analyses are carried out at the three-digit industry level, where each three-digit industry is a heterogenous mix of fourdigit industries, can generate an endogeneity problem. An increase in pollution abatement costs may result in an increase in imports of dirty four-digit products, a resulting contraction of dirty production from domestic four-digit industries and hence a decline in the average pollution intensity of domestic production in three-digit industries. Thus industries with rapidly increasing regulations are most likely to be imported, which will then reduce measured levels of abatement costs. Furthermore, this change in the composition of three-digit industries could also change other industry characteristics, including physical and human capital intensity. 20 An increase in imports can therefore influence the characteristics of three-digit industries.
(ii) Are environmental regulations used as secondary trade barriers?
Such an argument was first tested by Ederington and Minier (2003) who claim that countries may relax environmental regulations in those industries facing the greatest import penetration. They find some evidence for this assertion.
With these potential sources of endogeneity in mind we estimate a number of different model specifications. Table 6 provides the results. As a first step towards controlling for the potential endogeneity of our industry characteristics (PAOC, PCI and HCI), model (3) regresses NETXva on time-averaged values of PAOCva, PCI and HCI. Since three-digit industry specific fixed effects now drop out of the estimation due to collinearity, model (3) includes two-digit industry dummies. The sign and significance of our variables of interest continue to concord with our prior expectations. An alternative attempt to control for the possible endogeneity of our industry characteristics is provided by model (4). In this specification PAOCva, PCI and HCI are all lagged by one year thereby removing any contemporaneous relationship between industry characteristics and net exports. Again, we find the same sign and significance patterns as the previous models. The use of two and three year lags provides very similar results. utilise a set of instruments based upon the geographical dispersion of industries across US states as recommended by Levinson and Taylor (2004) . Since most US environmental regulations are set at the state level, the location and concentration of industries will provide information regarding the abatement costs that they face.
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The instruments we use are based on the premise that the marginal damage of pollution is an increasing function of the level of pollution. 
Where E refers to emissions from industry i in state s at time t. A high value of IV would suggest that an industry is located in a state with a large amount of pollution being generated by other industries.
As Levinson and Taylor (2004) point out, a valid instrument has to be correlated with abatement costs but uncorrelated with the error term in the net trade regression. Any variables that are related to industry location within the US and are correlated with the unobserved determinants of net trade would therefore pose a problem for our instruments. Whilst the use of these instruments controls for the potential endogeneity of PAOCva, we also have to allow for the fact that PCI and HCI may be endogenously determined. Levinson and Taylor (2004) simply drop these variables from their estimations, presumably relying on the fixed effects to capture the effects of PCI and HCI on
NETXva. This would appear unsatisfactory since the fixed effects obviously cannot control for any industry specific characteristics that change over time. In this paper, PCI
and HCI are, along with PAOCva, the variables of central interest and hence model (5) in Table 6 includes all three by instrumenting PAOCva and using one year lags of PCI and HCI. Model (6) replaces lagged PCI and HCI with time averaged PCI and HCI and includes two-digit industry dummies. In both estimations we find the instrumented PAOCva to be a statistically significant negative determinant of NETXva, whilst lagged and time-averaged PCI and HCI remain statistically significant positive determinants.
A statistical relationship alone, however, cannot explain why the US does not appear to have experienced low and/or declining specialization in dirty industries. In order to provide such an explanation we need to consider the economic significance of these variables. Table 7 reports the estimated elasticities for our key independent variables. 23 22 A Hausman test failed to reject the null of no systematic difference between the two sets of results. Note also that the possibility of polluting industries relocating to states where environmental regulations are lax does not cause a problem for our instruments. Take the example of an increase in Californian regulations. If industries do not relocate to lower regulation states then California's increase in standards, relative to other states, is valid instrument and there are no problems. But if industries do relocate then they must be incurring higher costs in some aspect of their activities or else the industry would have relocated there in the first place. So, again, the increase in Californian regulations will have imposed a higher cost on the industry (reflected in lower international comparative advantage) and hence provides a valid instrument. Thus, since the industrial composition (the weights used in calculating our instrument) is fixed at the base year, an increase in California's regulations will impose cost on its industries, either in the form of higher abatement costs or in the form of higher costs due to relocation to a less profitable location. 23 Although not reported for reasons already outlined, the estimation of models (3), (4), (5) and (6) for our other two specialization measures, RSCA and the Michaely index, yields results which support those from our reported models. More specifically, our key variables are statistically significant, with PAOCva negatively signed and PCI and HCI positively signed. Similarly, the estimated elasticities are consistent with those reported in Table 7 with elasticities for PCI and HCI generally larger than those estimated for PAOCva. Furthermore, the elasticities for PAOCva are larger when instrumental variables are used. The differences in our specialization measures and the variety of specifications used inevitably result in a range of different estimated elasticities. Elasticity estimates for RSCA appear to be the smallest in magnitude. The elasticity of net exports with respect to PAOCva varies between -0.6 and -2.8 across the six models. In Levinson and Taylor's (2004) study of US trade with Mexico and Canada, the equivalent elasticities ranged from 0.17 to 0.67. Table 7 also indicates that instrumenting PAOCva (models 5 and 6) does increase the magnitude of the estimated elasticity of net exports with respect to PAOCva. This finding is also made by Levinson and Taylor (2004) and Ederington and Minier (2003) in similar studies of US net exports. It would therefore appear that pollution abatement costs are subject to endogeneity concerns.
Of clear significance to this paper, however, is the finding that within each model the estimated elasticities for PCI and HCI are considerably larger than those estimated for
PAOCva. This finding holds for the RSCA and Michaely estimations and for all of the net export estimations. The elasticity of net exports (including the change in net exports) with respect to PCI varies between 1.4 and 3.8 whilst the equivalent elasticities for HCI lie between 1.2 and 4.5. Thus, whilst PAOCva does exert a negative influence on net exports (and RSCA and Michaely) ceteris paribus, this is outweighed by the positive influence of PCI and HCI. Since those sectors that are pollution intensive also tend to be skill and physical capital intensive as Section 3 demonstrated, it is therefore not surprising that we do not observe particularly low levels of net exports, RSCA and Michaely, nor a systematic reduction in such measures of specialization, within pollution intensive industries.
Discussion and Conclusions
Despite the fears of US politicians and the predictions of some theoretical models, the widespread relocation/displacement of pollution intensive industries from high regulation countries has failed to emerge. This is reflected in the specialization patterns of US pollution intensive industries. Although environmental regulations in the US are rising and appear to be high relative to those in many developing countries, specialization in US 'dirty' industries does not appear to be lower, nor declining more rapidly (or increasing more slowly) than in other US sectors.
This paper has demonstrated that the characteristics of dirty sectors can go some way towards explaining this finding. We illustrate in a variety of ways that pollution intensive industries are typically more intensive in the use of physical and human capital than cleaner industries. These factor intensities appear to be important determinants of US specialization patterns, suggesting that factor intensities and environmental regulations have a competing influence on revealed comparative advantage. We demonstrate econometrically that this is indeed the case. Whether we estimate RSCA, the Michaely index or net exports, we find that physical and human capital intensities are statistically significant positive determinants of US specialization, whilst pollution abatement costs are a statistically significant negative determinant. Furthermore, estimated elasticities indicate that the effects of a 1% increase in physical or human capital intensity on specialization are likely to be larger than the effects of a similar increase in abatement costs. If those sectors facing high abatement costs are indeed more intensive in the use of physical and/or human capital then this would explain why we do not see low and/or falling specialization in dirty industries.
For dirty industries, pollution abatement costs per unit of value added have increased over our sample period, as Table 2 indicates. However, since PCI and HCI have also increased over this period (again, see Table 2 ) the net change in specialization has not been negative. But what if abatement costs were to increase further, for example due to the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol? If PCI and HCI continue to increase then we could expect this to offset the negative pollution haven effect associated with PAOCva.
However, if PCI and HCI cease to increase, then we would expect US specialization to decline as abatement costs continue to rise. There is the possibility, however, that PCI and HCI will actually increase as a result of increasing PAOCva. Faced with high abatement costs firms may decide to invest in new, clean technology to prevent further increases in abatement costs. Such investment would increase PCI. Since the skill requirements of new high-technology equipment are likely to be greater, however, HCI may also rise. This may partially explain why PCI and HCI increased alongside PAOCva over our sample period. An investigation of these possible linkages is outside the remit of this paper.
It may be wise to finish on a note of caution since this paper has made a number of generalisations. In reality, of course, not all dirty sectors are highly physical and human capital intensity. Some may be intensive in one factor but not the other, for example the Primary Metals industry (SIC33) appears to be intensive in physical but not in human capital. Others may use neither of these factors intensively, particularly at the three or four-digit level. Some industries may be intensive in altogether different factors of production such as natural resource endowments that we are unable to control for due to lack of data. Nevertheless, across all industries generalised trends are observable which suggest that pollution intensive sectors do typically use physical and human capital in a relatively intensive manner. Thus, whilst US dirty industries may be attracted to the 'green grass' of low regulation developing countries, such countries may be less attractive to an industry intensive in the use of physical and human capital. We believe this finding provides a partial explanation for the lack of more widespread pollution haven evidence.
